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ABSTRACT

The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the owner of a Swedish restaurant was suing other
businesses for violating its registered trademark, which surprisingly consists of live goats on a grass
roof. The PTO and the courts have steadily enlarged the set of trade dress features that might serve
as trademarks, and there is no reason, in theory, to treat live animals differently. Nevertheless, the
PTO likely made a mistake in this instance when it agreed to register the mark. This article
evaluates the requirements for protecting trade dress with trademarks, and explains why a Swedish
restaurant should not have exclusive rights to put goats on a roof.
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TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF LIVE ANIMALS: THE BLEAT GOES ON
LEE B. BURGUNDER*

I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Wall Street Journal reported that the owner of a Swedish
restaurant in Wisconsin had sued a grocery store in Georgia for violating its
registered trademark, which surprisingly consisted of live goats on a grass roof.1 The
Georgia market settled the dispute, but its proprietor claimed that he legally could
have fought the claim because "it is ridiculous."2 At first blush, the notion that
trademarks might provide a business the exclusive right to display a breed of live
animals does seem somewhat far-fetched. After all, trademarks most typically
protect words and symbols that are used by customers to distinguish goods and
services. 3 Nevertheless, it is now well-established that trademarks can protect other
unusual characteristics, such as smellS 4 and sounds. 5 In this light, the use of live
animals may simply be an entertaining new way for firms to differentiate themselves
in the marketplace. 6
This article evaluates whether the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") made
the correct call when it decided to register the display of goats on a lawn roof as a
trademark. 7 As we shall see, this is difficult terrain that raises controversial linedrawing problems without clear guidance from the courts or Congress. Regarding
the goats, the most challenging aspect is the application of the functionality doctrine,
which serves to prevent trademarks from overstepping their role in a competitive

*C Lee B. Burgunder 2011. Professor of Business Law & Public Policy, California Polytechnic
State University, San Luis Obispo. J.D., Stanford University; M.B.A., Stanford University; A.B.,
Dartmouth College.

1Justin

Scheck & Stu Woo, Lars Johnson Has Goats on His Roof and a Stable of Lawyers to

Prove It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2010, at Al.
2 Id. (stating the Georgia market agreed to pay a licensing fee to gain rights to place goats on
grass roofs in Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina and Tennessee).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining trademarks as including "any word, symbol, or device or
combination thereof' used "to identify and distinguish his or her goods").
4 See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (referencing the smell of
plumeria blossoms for yarn); see, e.g., U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,639,128 (registering a
plumeria scent on yarn).
5See, e.g., U.S. Trademark Registration No. 916,522 (registering the sound of the NBC
chimes).
6This article does not specifically address the use of live animals as advertising mascots, such
as Morris the Cat, the Taco Bell chihuahua, Spuds MacKenzie, or the Aflac duck, nor the common
practice of incorporating images of animals in trademarks. Disputes regarding these forms of
animal symbols typically involve questions about the likelihood of confusion, but usually do not raise
issues regarding distinctiveness and functionality. For a recent example of a dispute involving the
use of marsupials on wine labels see David Kesmodel, Look-Alike Wines Featuring Look-Alike
MarsupialsDuke it Out, WALL ST J., Feb. 26, 2011, at Al.
SU.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,007,624 (registering the placement of goats on a grass
roof) [hereinafter Reg. No. 2,007,624].
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market. 8 It is here that the PTO probably made a mistake by allowing a restaurant
to have exclusive rights to place goats on a roof. This does not mean that live
animals never can serve as trademarks. Rather, the circumstances just have to be
sufficiently different so that all relevant trademark criteria are appropriately met.

II. THE RESTAURANT AND THE GOATS

Al Johnson's Swedish Restaurant and Butik is designed to give its patrons in
Sister Bay, Wisconsin a dining experience that provides "a taste of Sweden." 9 To this
end, Al Johnson and his wife created an environment with traditional Swedish
touches, from authentic flatware, dishes and decorations to log buildings that were
transported from Sweden and rebuilt on the premises. 10 The restaurant also serves
traditional Swedish fare, including Swedish pancakes and meatballs, lingonberries
and Limpa bread.11 According to a brochure, the owners decided to sod the roof in
1974 "to add a finishing touch of authenticity." 1 2 The brochure also states that a
herd of goats was placed on the roof to "keep the sod trimmed." 1 3
From the very beginning, the goats were an enormously successful attraction for
the restaurant, and the summer business became packed with tourists. 1 4 Indeed,
according to a news account, the restaurant adopted the slogan, "Come for the
Goats-Stay for the Food." 15 Typically, the restaurant puts three or four goats on the

8See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that the
doctrine of functionality was meant to "prevent the grant of a perpetual monopoly to features which
cannot be patented"); Nancy L. Clarke, Issues in the Federal Registration of Flavors as Trademarks
for PharmaceuticalProducts, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 110 (1993).
9 Much of the information about the restaurant comes from the "specimens" filed at the PTO
with the trademark application. For a list of such documents, see Retrieve Trademark Documents,
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tdr.uspto.gov/init.action (search for "2007624" under "US

Registration No") (last visited June 9, 2011).
10Document Specimen of Jun. 19, 2006, U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,007,624
[hereinafter Restaurant Brochure], available at http://tdr.uspto.gov/init.action (search for "2007624"
under "US Registration No" and click on "Specimen" dated 19-Jun-2006); see also History, AL
JOHNSON'S SWEDISH RESTAURANT & BUTIK, http://www.aljohnsons.com/about-us/history (last visited
June 9, 2011).
11Menu, AL JOHNSON'S SWEDISH RESTAURANT & BUTIK, http://www.aljohnsons.com/menu.
(last visited June 9, 2011).
12Restaurant Brochure, supra note 10.
13Id. According to a news report, Al Johnson's best friend first gave him a goat as a gag gift,
which someone then placed on the roof. See Scheck & Woo, supra note 1. The goat attracted so
much attention that the owners decided to add others to the roof. Id.
14Scheck & Woo, supra note 1; What's Up on the Roof? Goats!, WSJ.COM (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://www.marketwatch.com/video/asset/what-up-on-the-roof-goats/E6A345E3-902D-438D-8E31E40D103E4BD1 (video demonstrating the popularity of the goats on the Al Johnson restaurant).
15 Stephan Kinsella, When Trademark Law and Goats Run Amok, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/M\/ises-Economics-Blog/2010/0924/When(Sept. 24, 2010),
trademark-law-and-goats-run-amok.
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roof everyday during daylight hours except in winter, or when it is rainy or windy. 16
The goats are very sure-footed, and rarely, if ever, fall off the roof. 17
The restaurant filed a trademark application with the PTO in February 1995 for
a mark that consists of "goats on a roof of grass," within the class of restaurant
services. 18 The PTO registered the mark in October 1996.19 The registration makes
it clear that the shape of the roof in the drawing is not a feature of the mark, and
that registration extends to any depiction of goats on any shape of roof with a grass
covering. 20 According to the restaurant's lawyer, "any business that sells food and
uses goats to lure customers may be violating the trademark."2 1
With this
understanding, the restaurant has not only sued the grocery store in Georgia, but
has sent cease and desist letters to several other businesses, including a gift shop in
Wisconsin with a fake goat on its roof.22 Because the restaurant's use and
registration in the U.S. do not govern similar uses beyond national borders, however,
food markets and coffee shops in other countries have placed live goats on their roofs
to attract customers. 23

III. TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES AND TRADE DRESS PROTECTION

A. The Role of Trademarks in the Intellectual Property System
The backbone of the U.S. economic system is free competition. 2 4 Allowing
competitors to freely copy products and services furthers social welfare through lower
costs, better services and reduced prices. 25 Inventors and creators may be reluctant
to invest in new ideas, however, if they know that others can freely take them once
they are disclosed in the marketplace. Thus, they may forego the development of
16Restaurant Brochure, supra note 10.
17 Id. (stating that the goats never fall off the roof).

However, a more recent news story

indicates that one of the goats did fall in 2009, fortunately without harming the goat or any
bystanders. Scheck & Woo, supra note 1, at Al.
18 Reg. No. 2,007,624.
19 Id.

20 Id. (describing the mark as "[t]he mark consists of goats on a roof of grass ... [t]he dotted
lines in the drawing are intended to indicate the location of the mark and are not a feature of the
mark").
21 Scheck & Woo, supra note 1, at Al.

Id
23 See, e.g., Goats on the Roof- Coffee Shop and Rare Breed Centre, GOATS ON THE ROOF BLOG
(Apr. 16. 2011, 3:16 PM), http://goatsontheroofcoffeeshop.blogspot.com (describing a coffee shop in
Northumberland, England); THE OLD COUNTRY MARKET, http://www.oldcountrymarket.com (last
visited June 9, 2011) (describing a market in Coombs, British Columbia, which calls itself the "Home
of the Goats on the Roof').
24 See, e.g., Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943)
("[T]here is a basic public policy, deep-rooted in our economy and respected by the courts, resting on
22

the assumption that social welfare is best advanced by free competition. . . .").
25 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOlvIlC PERSPECTIVE 242-43 (1976)
(noting that monopolies preventing free competition create a social loss stemming from lower output

and loss in value); see, e.g., Lee Burgunder, Trademark Registration of Product Colors: Issues and
Answers, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 583 (1986).
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these ideas altogether, or find ways to distribute them through secret channels. 26 In
either event, members of society suffer because they never get to fully benefit from
new creations that they otherwise might have enjoyed.
The patent and copyright systems intend to solve this dilemma by providing
creators certain specified exclusive rights over their concepts for a limited amount of
time so they have sufficient incentives to develop the concepts and disclose them to
the public. 27 Utility patents, for instance, provide inventors who develop useful
products and processes the exclusive rights to make, use and sell their creations for
twenty years. 28 The extent of the rights strikes a delicate balance, interfering with
the free market just enough to properly reward inventors before allowing competitors
to gain free access. 29 In similar fashion, design patents protect ornamental product
designs for fourteen years while copyright protection provides exclusive rights to
creative expressions for a designated length of time. 30
Although trademarks also provide exclusive rights, they do so for significantly
different reasons than patents and copyrights. 31 In a completely free market system,
competitors would be able to replicate every attribute of a product or service down to
the minutest detail. 32 Thus, a manufacturer that attempts to help consumers find its
products, say with tags or other forms of identification, could be foiled by competitors
who are able to identically copy any potentially distinguishing attribute. 33 This
creates several negative outcomes for social welfare. First, it enables cheap imitators
to deceive consumers and palm off their typically inferior products to consumers
seeking merchandise from a particular source. 34 Thus, consumers may be unfairly
fooled into buying products that they do not want. As a result, consumers may be
forced to engage in more expensive evaluation methods to find products from the
manufacturer that they prefer. 35 These extra search costs serve as a drain on
society. 36 In addition, manufacturers may think twice about investing in high
quality standards if competitors can so easily fool consumers with inferior
26 See Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873,
878 (1971) ("[A]1though short range competitive interests would benefit from immediate and free
public access to technological and artistic innovation, to permit such access would destroy incentive
to innovate; new products and works would not be introduced into the market and consequently the
long range competitive situation would decline.").
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing exclusive rights for limited times to authors and
inventors).
28 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing a twenty year term from the application filing date).
29 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("From
their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both
necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.").
30 35 U.S.C. § 173; 17 U.S.C. § 302.
31

Lee B. Burgunder, Product Design Protection after Bonito Boats: Where it Belongs and How

it Should Get There, 28 Am. BUS. L.J. 1, 7-10 (1990); Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits
and the Demise of "Trademark Use", 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 377 (2006); see Mark P. McKenna,
The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DA1VIE L. REV. 1839, 1884-85 (2007);
Burgunder, supra note 25, at 586-90 (discussing the purposes of trademarks).
32 Burgunder, supra note 31, at 7-10.
33 See Barrett, supra note 31, at 376.
34 See Burgunder, supra note 31, at 8.
35 See id. at 8-10.
36 See id at 9.
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merchandise. Thus, totally free competition encourages unethical conduct, which
ultimately burdens consumers and discourages investments in goodwill.
The trademark system is designed to solve these problems, without diminishing
the benefits of free competition, by granting exclusive rights to identification symbols
that consumers can use to distinguish the sources of goods and services in the
marketplace. 37 In theory, trademarks enhance the operation of free markets because
they facilitate the identification function without depriving competitors from
anything that they need to fairly compete. 38 For instance, Nike's® sole right to place
the Swoosh on its shoes helps consumers locate its merchandise; yet protection does
not provide Nike® with a competitive advantage because competitors have
innumerable alternative options that they may choose to serve as identifiers for their
products.
Based on these considerations, trademarks have several essential attributes.
Perhaps most importantly, they are simply the identifying characteristics that are
included with products or services to help consumers locate what they want.39 The
trademark system prevents competitors from mimicking the representational device,
but it does not stop them from freely duplicating the underlying product or service
that the device serves to identify. 40 Also, a properly functioning trademark must be
capable of distinguishing the product or service from others in the market so that
customers may readily find what they seek without being confused. 41 If the identifier
is already used by a competitive firm, or is commonly used with similar products,
then it cannot serve requisite trademark functions. 42 Finally, trademark protection
should not result in a market advantage. 43 If competitors do not have a sufficient
number of equally informative or desirable ways to designate the sources of their
products or services, then trademark protection should be denied.

B. The Lanham Act and Application of Federal Trademark Principles
U.S. trademark policy first developed through state common law principles
under the rubric of unfair competition. 44 Federal protection, as codified in the
Lanham Act, was primarily adopted to extend similar protections at a national
level. 4 5 It does this with a registration system that provides nationwide rights to
exclusive use of a mark. 46 Specifically, the Lanham Act allows the registration of
§ 1115 (2006); see, e.g., Burgunder, supra note 31, at 7-10.
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) ("In truth, a trademark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for
facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a
commercial signature-upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.").
39Burgunder, supra note 31, at 9.
4
37 See 15 U.S.C.
38

01d. at 9.

41 Barrett,

supra note 31, at 378.
42Burgunder, supra note 31, at 9.
43 Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the Close Association
Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 96 (1989).
44 MAYLAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 3-4 (2005).

45 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006); see, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685
F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982); SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980).
46See 15 U.S.C. § 1115.
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"any word, name, symbol or device" that is capable of identifying and distinguishing
goods or services. 47 The Act also includes federal unfair competition policies that
protect unregistered identification marks from uses that are likely to cause confusion
or dilution.48
As you might suspect, fundamental trademark principles are easiest to apply
when protection is sought for words, names, or symbols because these kinds of marks
are clearly separate from the products or services that they represent. 49 Thus, in
these instances, the focus of the evaluation is limited to the distinctiveness of the
mark and whether exclusive rights to the mark could provide a competitive
advantage. 50 The framework for considering names and words was best articulated
in the case, Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,5 1 which established a
spectrum of protection that provides increasingly greater rights. 52 At the low end of
the spectrum are generic words, such as amplifier, which cannot be registered or
protected. 53 Such marks, by definition, cannot be distinctive for a particular
manufacturer or service provider because the words used designate the entire class of
products. 54 Also, exclusive rights to a generic term certainly would be unfair to other
manufacturers, who would then have to take extra measures to inform consumers
that their products are within the same competitive class. 55
Next on the scale are descriptive terms, which describe the nature or features of
the article or service. 56 These words cannot be immediately protected because
consumers will initially understand them as a descriptor of the product rather than a
designator of source. 5 7 Therefore, they do not serve to identify products in the
marketplace. Also, there may only be a limited supply of words or phrases that
suitably describe the products with equal force. Thus, there is some danger of
competitive harms, albeit less than with the sole generic term, because the number of
available options may be too few to serve all market participants. 5 8 The situation
changes, however, if one company exclusively uses a descriptive term for sufficient
time backed by effective advertising, since consumers then may come to understand
that the word has source-designation properties. In this instance, the term is said to

§ 1127.
8Id. § 1125.
49 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 263, 268 (1987).
50 Id. at 287-88.
51 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
52 Id. at 9 (identifying the four categories of protection: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and
fanciful/arbitrary).
47 Id.
4

53Id.
54Id.
55 Id. at 10 (stating that the protection of generic terms "must be denied since this in effect
would confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the product by rendering a competitor unable
effectively to name what it was endeavoring to sell").
56 Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984).
57 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2006); see Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 289-90 (noting that a
given product only has "so many attributes that interest buyers").
58 Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 289-90 (explaining that if one producer takes the word
that describes a product, he has the competitive edge over his rivals who cannot use the word to
describe a similar product).
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have secondary meaning, which refers to the resultant identifying capacity. 59
Despite potential competitive concerns, the Lanham Act then allows protection, since
the harms from potential confusion outweigh the dangers raised by competitive
needs.60

At the top of the spectrum are suggestive and totally arbitrary terms, which can
serve as trademarks immediately. 6 1
Since their meanings have little or no
relationship to the products or services they represent, they will almost certainly
identify source in the eyes of consumers. 62 Therefore, they are appropriately
distinctive in a trademark sense. 63 Also, the number of equivalent options open to
competitors is extremely high, if not unlimited. Thus, there are no concerns that
competitors will be disadvantaged because they cannot legally use the word. 64
The Lanham Act provides protection to, inter alia, any distinguishing device. 65
The courts have interpreted this term expansively to include numerous product
attributes under the umbrella term trade dress, which includes such attributes as
product shapes, designs, colors, odors and sounds. 66 Unlike names, words and
symbols, many of these characteristics cannot be readily separated from the
represented product because they are part of the product, itself. 67 This leads to
59 E.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (noting that
secondary meaning occurs when "in the minds of the consuming public, the primary significance of a
[mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself'); see Landes & Posner,
supra note 49, at 289-90 (explaining how over time the dictionary definition of a word might go out
of common use and the word might come to signify a particular brand).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f). The rationale for allowing protection of descriptive marks with proof of
secondary meaning was explained in Abercrombie as follows: With descriptive terms,
the law strikes the balance, with respect to registration, between the hardships to
a competitor in hampering the use of an appropriate word and those to the owner
who, having invested money and energy to endow a word with the good will
adhering to his enterprise, would be deprived of the fruits of his efforts.
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 290 (adding that once a
descriptive mark signifies a brand name in customers' minds, the word reduces confusion and search
costs "more than the costs to rivals being forbidden to use the same word").
61 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10-11.

62 See Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 289 (stating that an arbitrary term is "a word in

common use" that is unrelated to the product it names).
63 George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 394 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996)) (explaining that arbitrary
marks are inherently distinctive because "they do not suggest or describe any quality, ingredient, or
characteristic," allowing the mark to be seen as "arbitrarily assigned").
64
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11.
[T]he reason for restricting the protection accorded descriptive terms, namely the
undesirability of preventing an entrant from using a descriptive term for his
product, is much less forceful when the trademark is a suggestive word since ...
"[t]he English language has a wealth of synonyms and related words with which
to describe the qualities which manufacturers may wish to claim for their
products . . . ."
Id. (quoting Aluminum Fabricating Co. of Pittsburgh v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 317
(2d Cir. 1958)); accord Landes & Posner, supra note 49, at 290.
65 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
66 See, e.g., Wal-Mart 5tores, Inc. v. 5amara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000); Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 764 (1992); Abercrombie & Fitch 5tores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle
Outfitters, Inc. 280 F.3d 619, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2002).
67 See Abercrombie & Fitch, 280 F.3d at 637.
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additional factors that must be considered before granting trademark protection. In
fact, the issues are so difficult that many of the Supreme Court's most recent
trademark cases have explored the limits of trademark protection for trade dress. 68

1. The Issue of Distinctiveness for Trade Dress
With traditional trademarks, consumers can readily determine that the names,
words or symbols are intended to serve identification functions. 69 With trade dress,
however, the line may not always be so clear. 70 For instance, when a designer first
introduces a chair with an unusually tall backrest, customers will typically first
perceive the entire item, including the backrest, as simply a new product on the
market. Over time, though, the public may begin to associate the high back with a
particular source, perhaps because the designer started selling other chairs with the
same feature or due to advertising that highlighted the connection. Thus, as with
descriptive marks, the trademark function of the particular feature only arises over
time when consumers recognize the secondary meaning.7 1
One issue addressed by the Supreme Court is whether product designs, such as
with the chair, can ever be so unique or unusual that consumers will automatically
perceive the trademark function. 72 In other words, could their source-identification
properties be so inherently distinctive that trademark registration should be allowed,
as with fanciful names, without proof of secondary meaning? In Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Samara Bros, Inc., 73 the Court determined that the likelihood of such inherent
distinctiveness with product designs is extremely unlikely, and it therefore created a
blanket rule requiring proof of secondary meaning. 74
With other kinds of trade dress, however, such as designs in packaging, the
Court concluded that consumers might readily perceive the separate source
identifying attributes, and so held that immediate protection could be warranted
based on inherent distinctiveness. 75 The Court followed the spectrum analysis of
Abercrombie & Fitch, and determined that inherently distinctive packaging
elements-those that are unique or unusual in a particular field-can serve as
68E.g., Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26 (2001); Samara Bros., 529
U.S. at 207; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 173 (1995); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at
764-65.
69See, e.g., Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 212-13 ("[T]he very purpose of attaching a particular
word to a product, or encasing it in a distinctive packaging, is most often to identify the source of the
product.").
70Id. at 213 ("[P]roduct design almost invariably serves purposes other than source
identification. . .
71
See id. at 211-12.
72 Id. at 213 (noting that consumers understand that product designs, even the most unusual,
are not intended to "identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more
appealing").
73Id. at 205.
74 Id. at 214 ("[G]iven the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of
allowing suit based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.").
75 For instance, packaging might be the shape or design of a cereal box or a wine bottle. See,
e.g., Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 214-15 (adding that the Court made the distinction between
packaging designs and product designs).
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trademarks without further proof, in the same way as arbitrary or fanciful words. 76
The Court also recognized that generic elements, those that are common in the
industry, can never be protected. 77 All other kinds of packaging designs should be
treated like descriptive marks, therefore requiring proof of secondary meaning.7 8 For
instance, these might be designs that are refinements of those commonly adopted for
a particular class of goods. 79
The difficulty with these two sets of standards is that it is not always easy to
differentiate between the product and the packaging. For instance, the Court
believed that the trade dress for a Mexican restaurant, which included its paintings,
artifacts, patio structures, and awning colors, should be treated like packaging, and
so allowed protection without proof of secondary meaning based on a finding of
inherent distinctiveness. 80 On the other hand, it would be easy to argue that the
service provided by the restaurant is more than its food, and includes the ambiance
of the surroundings.8 1 With this perspective, the trade dress is an inseparable
76 Id. at 214.
The Court noted that the following factors are relevant in determining the
distinctiveness of packaging design: (1) whether it is a common basic shape or design; (2) whether it
is unique or unusual in a particular field; and (3) whether it is a mere refinement of a commonlyadopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods. Id. The Court also
indicated that these factors were developed to address distinctiveness in a packaging case, but that
they are not applicable to product design. Id. The factors were first devised in Seabrook Foods, Inc.
v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and are often called the Seabrook
factors. Id.; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992).
77 This may be inferred from Two Pesos since the Court based its decision on Abercrombie's
spectrum of increasing distinctiveness while also determining that the Lanham Act provides no
basis for distinguishing between protection for trademarks and trade dress. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at
773. See also Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. 280 F.3d 619, 638 (6th
Cir. 2002) ("Thus Samara Brothers leaves in place the rule that generic product configurations are
not protectable as trade dress. . . . "); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985)
("[I]f the feature is not ornamental or fanciful or whimsical or arbitrary, but is somehow intrinsic to
the entire product consisting of this manufacturer's brand and his rivals' brands, trademark
protection will be denied.").
78 Abercrombie & Fitch, 280 F.3d at 636 (noting that the United States Supreme Court decided
that product packaging is inherently distinctive, but product configuration must show secondary

meaning to acquire distinctiveness).
79 This is inferred from the Seabrook factors, which correspond to generic, descriptive, and
inherently distinctive word marks. Seabrook, 568 F.2d at 1344. See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark
Protection of Product Characteristics:A Predictive Model, 16 J. PUB. POLY & MKTG. 277, 280 (1997);
see also Nova Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 745 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding a
one and a half liter ribbed PET water bottle's design and label to be descriptive elements capable of
protection, even though those elements were common within the industry); Carillon Imps. Ltd. v.
The Frank Pesce Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ("Despite the commonplace use
of some of these individual components [of the at-issue trade dress] in the marketing of alcoholic
beverages other than ultra premium vodkas, their use here is a fanciful addition to the vodka
market.").
80 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775-76. The Court indicated that the trade dress for the Mexican
restaurant should be evaluated as packaging, saying that: "[T]he decor of a restaurant seems to us
not to constitute product design. It was either product packaging. . . or else some tertium quid that
is akin to product packaging." Id.
81 Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of Secondary Meaning in the
Making, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 737, 775-76 (1993) (explaining that a restaurant's trade dress is not
protectable if the purpose is just to merely please the diners or bring up the restaurant's attributes,
adding, however, that an aesthetically pleasing ambiance is important in a restaurant's success and
thus should be protectable).
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component of the restaurant's "product," and so should be treated no differently than
the backrest of the chair.
At the end of the day, the outcome of this debate probably does not affect the
trademark status of Al Johnson's goats on the lawn roof. The notion of goats on a
roof certainly is not generic, and so the feature is subject to registration under either
formulation with proof of secondary meaning. Since the Lanham Act provides that
five years of exclusive use is prima facie evidence of secondary meaning, registration
was likely appropriate even with a secondary meaning requirement. 82 Of course, if
the goats and lawn roof are considered part of the packaging for the restaurant, as
the Supreme Court suggests, then they might have been subject to immediate
protection based on a determination of inherent distinctiveness. 83 As we shall see,
the only question here is how the service class is defined. For instance, if the service
is "Swedish restaurants," then goats on the roof seems pretty unique. On the other
hand, if the class is "Swedish restaurants with a rural atmosphere including live
farm animals," then putting them on the roof may be viewed as something closer to a
refinement.

2. The Issue of Functionalityfor Trade Dress
Since product designs and processes are subject to patent protection, one must
be careful to ensure that the trademark system does not overstep its bounds and
thereby interfere with the carefully crafted balance of the patent regime. 84 In this
regard, the courts are concerned with two somewhat separate issues. The first is
based on the general notion that useful inventions and product designs are supposed
to be subject to free competition unless they are covered by a patent. 85 Thus,
tensions inevitably arise when trademarks protect unpatented useful attributes. The
other issue relates to the goal of patents-to provide incentives through potential
profits by the protection of superior competitive characteristics. 86 For this reason,
trademarks are especially bothersome when they, too, offer competitive advantages. 8 7
15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
83Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 787 (Thomas, J., concurring).
84See, e.g., Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th
Cir. 1985). This is particularly true when litigants claim exclusive rights to product attributes
through state unfair competition laws due to the supremacy of the federal patent statute. See
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,
237-38 (1964).
85See, e.g., Traffix, 532 U.S. at 29 ("In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a
patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.").
86 If an invention had no advantages over existing technologies for any set of consumers, then
patent protection would not be economically profitable. See Burgunder, supra note 25, at 593 ("Only
the patent and copyright laws are designed to allow a producer to achieve supranormal profits.");
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164-65 (stating that it is the province of patents to encourage invention by
granting a monopoly over product designs, but color may be protected as long as it is not more
desirable than other colors could be).
87Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 16-17 (1996) (explaining that in the 1960s and 1970s, trademarks came under attack for
being "inherently anticompetitive").
82
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To address these concerns, the courts have developed the functionality doctrine and
Congress has adopted it by explicitly prohibiting federal trademark registration or
protection if a feature is functional.88
According to the Supreme Court, "'a product is functional,' and cannot serve as a
trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost
or quality of the article."' 89 This is true, according to the Court, even if the design
has acquired secondary meaning.90
Unfortunately, the application of the
functionality definition has been controversial and confusing, and now depends on
whether the features are useful or merely attractive. 91 In this regard, the courts
have divided the functionality doctrine into two categories: utilitarian functionality
and aesthetic functionality.

a. UtilitarianFunctionality
In Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 92 the Supreme Court
considered whether the appearance of a previously patented dual-spring sign design
could serve as a trademark. 93 The Court of Appeals had held that the design could be
protected by a trademark because there were other ways to achieve the goal of wind
resistance without duplicating the look of the sign. 94 That is, the dual-spring design
was not a competitive necessity, or in other words, was not essential to the use or
purpose of the article. 95 The Supreme Court reversed, stating that a feature is
"essential" not because it is competitively necessary, but because it makes an
important contribution to the use of an article. 96 The Court determined that a
previous patent is strong evidence that a useful feature is functional, but it indicated
that the same principle applies even when a useful feature has never been
patented.97

15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(5), 1125(a)(3) (2006).
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)
90 Traffix, 532 U.S. at 26 (noting that if dual-spring design is functional, secondary meaning is
irrelevant).
88
89

91Id. at 33.
92

Id. at 28.

93 Id. at 25.

94 Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. Traffix, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 1999).
95 Id.
96Traffix, 532 U.S. at 32-33.
97 Id. at 35 (stating that product designs are functional under the same standard, "whether a
utility patent has expired or there has been no utility patent at all"). Despite the ruling in Traffix,
some courts still consider the availability of alternative designs to be a relevant factor when
addressing functionality. See, e.g., Talking Rain Beverage Co. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 349 F.3d
601, 603 (9th Cir. 2003). In this courts' view, alternative designs cannot negate a finding of
functionality, but may indicate whether a design embodies merely ornamental or incidental aspects
of the product. Id.
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b. Aesthetic Functionality
Although Traffix takes an absolute stand that important useful features cannot
be protected by trademarks, the courts recognize that different standards should
apply to attractive designs. 98 One reason for the difference is that the market could
be a dull and unimaginative place if designers had to rely solely on the design patent
system to protect aesthetic innovation. 99 In addition, trademarks, by nature, are
aesthetic identifiers that are included with useful products, so it would be overly
limiting to deny protection based solely on the aesthetic qualities. 100 Also, with
service marks, aesthetic identifiers less clearly overstep into the realm of patents,
1 01
because design patents only apply to "articles of manufacture."o
For these reasons,
the functionality doctrine with aesthetic attributes is founded on the more general
notion of competitive need, which, as explained in Abercrombie & Fitch, is relevant
even with word marks. 102
The concept of aesthetic functionality has raised troubling issues in the
courts. 1 03 In some cases, courts have denied protection to aesthetic features when
they are "an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product." 1 04 For
instance, a court denied protection for the design of an Italian sofa because the
stylistic attributes enhanced the salability of the goods. 105 In the court's view, the
98 See, e.g., Traffix, 532 U.S. at 33; In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Co., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
9 See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985) (criticizing a strict
application of the functionality doctrine to aesthetic features because "it provides a disincentive for
development of imaginative and attractive design"); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d
822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981) ("As our ambience becomes more mechanized and banal, it would be
unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which could transform an ordinary
product into one of grace.").
100See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that if giving
aesthetic pleasure is a function, then "[f]unctionality would swallow up much, perhaps all, of
trademark law").
101 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006).
102 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 636 (6th
Cir. 2002); Rogers, 778 F.2d at 339 ("A functional feature

...

is unlike those dispensable features of

the particular brand that, like an arbitrary identifying name, rivals do not need in order to compete
effectively.").
103 See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 1984); Robert Unikel,
Better by Design: The Availability of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design and the Demise of
"Aesthetic Functionality" 85 TRADEMARK REP. 312 (2005). Some courts once denied the applicability
of aesthetic functionality in all circumstances. See, e.g., Click Billiards v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d
1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Nor has this circuit adopted the 'aesthetic functionality' theory, that is,
the notion that a purely aesthetic feature can be functional."); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,
155 F.3d 526, 540 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) ("This circuit has rejected the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality."). These rulings have been superseded by the Supreme Court's opinion in Traffix
which explicitly accepts aesthetic functionality. Traffix, 532 U.S. at 33 ("It is proper to inquire into
a 'significant non-reputation related disadvantage' in cases of aesthetic functionality.").
104 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) (finding that floral design
pattern on china cannot be protected as a trademark because of functionality). Some courts have
greatly criticized or rejected this standard. See, e.g., Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 825. However, the
Supreme Court recently noted this standard in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159
(1995).
105 Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir.
1984).
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design did not act like a trademark because it was not simply a label but a principal
characteristic of the sofa. 106
An aesthetic feature that does not have such inherent marketing importance
may still be functional, but only if it is more pleasing than potential alternative
designs. 107 In this regard, the leading case is Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co., 108 which dealt with the aesthetic functionality of the overall green-gold color of
dry cleaning pads. Unlike with the design of the sofa, the color of the pads was not
an important reason for purchase. 109 Yet, the Court recognized that an evaluation of
aesthetic functionality was still required to ensure that there was no competitive
need for the specific green-gold color. 110 To this end, the court determined that the
color was not functional since other colors were equally usable. 111 The Court
reiterated the point in Traffix, claiming that "it is proper to inquire into a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage in cases of aesthetic functionality." 11 2
As we shall see, the notion of competitive need requires one to first define the
relevant competitive market. 11 3 The more broadly one defines the market, the
greater will be the number of competitive possibilities. The history of antitrust laws
demonstrates that this is a difficult exercise. 1 1 4 Antitrust law also instructs that one
may need to focus on competitive submarkets that target specific types of

106Id. (denying trademark protection based on aesthetic functionality because the "overall
design makes the sofas attractive to buyers despite enormously expensive price tags, and there is no
arbitrary embellishment or label which might be considered a trademark").
107 See Rogers, 778 F.2d at 340 ("It would also be unreasonable to let a manufacturer use
trademark law to prevent competitors from making pleasing substitutes for his own brand; yet that
would be the effect of allowing him to appropriate the most pleasing way of configuring the
product.").
108 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 166.
109 Id. The Court ruled that the color could be protected as a trademark because it would not
"permit one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (non-trademark-related) competition
through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product ingredient." Id. at 170.
110 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7, cmt. c (1993)) ("[I]f a
design's 'aesthetic value' lies in its ability to 'confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be

duplicated by the use of alternative designs,' then the design is 'functional."').
111 Id. at 166.
112 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). The qualification
regarding non-reputation-related advantages ensures that the aesthetic need arises from the
inherent desirability of the feature, rather than from the goodwill in a mark. For instance, a maker
of key chains does not have the right to copy the trademarks of auto manufacturers just because the
owners of car brands prefer to have key chains with matching logos. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Rogers, 778 F.2d at 344 ("A
design feature to be aesthetically functional must be pleasing in itself; it is not enough that a person
who owns two items with that feature wants a matched pair.").
113 See Burgunder, supra note 79, at 285; Anna F. Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual
Property Law: Should Intellectual Property Courts Use an Antitrust Approach to Market Definition?,
8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 68 (2004) (noting that an assessment of functionality requires
that a court "identify competitors, which in turn requires identification of the market in which they
compete").
114 See, e.g., PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 491-525 (6th ed., 2004); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, at 8 (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES].
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consumers. 115 These considerations may prove to be important when addressing the
potential aesthetic functionality of the goats.

IV. ABSTRACTION AND FILTRATION: LESSONS FROM COPYRIGHT

Although trademark law protects trade dress, we have seen that protection will
not extend to those elements that are generic or functional, either in a utilitarian or
aesthetic sense. This means that when the PTO makes a decision to register a
trademark, it must be convinced that protectable elements remain after generic and
functional attributes are conceptually removed from the design or packaging. 1 1 6
Some decisions about genericism and functionality, though, depend on an accepted
definition of the relevant product or service class.
As just noted, there may be several ways to define the relevant class, and minds
may differ on the proper choice. The same difficulty arises in copyright where one
must choose among the numerous ways that the ideas of works may be abstracted. 117
In fact, the copyright system provides a good model for the evaluation of trademarks
because copyrights, like trademarks, demand filtration of unprotected elements. 118
Furthermore, one must be equally careful with both copyrights and trademarks to
filter unprotected material in an appropriate fashion. For instance, with copyrights,
one needs to filter out public information and facts-meaning that others are free to
use them in their works. 119 Protection, however, still may extend to the selection and
organization of those elements. 1 20 Likewise, with trademarks and trade dress,
competitors are free to use generic or functional items, but may not be able to
arrange them in the same way as the original firm. 121
As an example, consider a pool hall that either seeks trademark registration for
its overall appearance, or sues a competitor for having confusingly similar
115 See Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
116 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1209.01(c) (7th ed., 2010) [hereinafter TMEP].
The notion of "conceptual separation" is also relevant in the context of copyright protection for
product designs. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories By Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding copyright protection of belt buckles was appropriate because the ornamental aspects were
conceptually separate from the utilitarian function).
117 See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); Lotus Dev. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 60-61 (D. Mass. 1990).
118 See Computer Assoc., Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that at
each level of abstraction, filtration is needed to separate elements taken from the public domain,
those dictated by efficiency and those dictated by external factors). Filtration in copyright also
explicitly depends on preserving appropriate competition through application of various tests, such
as merger and scenes a faire that evaluate whether attributes are essential to convey an idea. See,
e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980); Lotus Dev., 740 F.
Supp. at 59, 67. For a thorough discussion about the transference of copyright principles to
trademarks, see Burgunder, supra note 43, at 113-17.
119 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-50 (1991).
120 Id. at 350.
121 See, e.g., Clicks Billiards v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1259 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that competitors are free to use individual functional elements of a pool hall but cannot
duplicate "the overall visual impression that the combination and arrangement of those elements
create").
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facilities. 1 22 As a first step, one must determine a relevant service class. 1 23 This may
simply be recreationalfacilities, and if so, the first business that includes several pool
tables may have a distinctive appearance. In this event, other firms would not be
able to provide recreation services with pool tables because they may seem
confusingly similar. Even if one initially accepted this high level of abstraction,
however, providing facilities to play pool would certainly be functional in a utilitarian
sense.
Thus, this attribute must be filtered so that it is included among the
attributes that cannot serve as trademarks. In other words, the notion of a pool hall
would become part of the relevant unprotected class. Of course, given the reality of
the current recreational environment, a pool hall is also generic. This again means
that the relevant market, at its most abstract, should be pool halls.
With this basis, many items within a pool hall are either generic and/or
functional, such as green table felt, over-the-table lights, pool cue racks, scoring
systems, an alcoholic beverage bar, and a food counter serving burgers and fries.
Nonetheless, the pool hall may be able to claim that its particular selection and
arrangement of these items within the facility are nonfunctional and distinctive,
especially if combined with other unique elements, such as wall colors, tile choices,
window covers, and wood finishes. 1 24 Thus, competitors would be free to use the
unprotected items in their facilities, but might have to combine them in different
ways to avoid confusing customers.
A few examples help to further explain these concepts. Assume the appearance
of a stuffed moose hanging on a wall is generic to pool halls. If one facility, however,
always placed the moose at a particular spot on the left side of the building, then this
location could become distinctive of that particular pool hall. It also would not be
aesthetically functional because the location of the moose is not an important
ingredient in the success of the business, and other businesses have numerous other
placement options to hang their moose. Of course, it is possible that a particular
location, such as directly in front of the entrance, could be generic and/or better than
other options due to its immediate visibility, and if so, a pool hall could not control
the spot via trademark policies. 1 25 But even then, trademarks might cover the
location in conjunction with other attributes, such as the moose's size, color and
expression, if the overall combination is distinctive and nonfunctional. 126
Now suppose that a pool hall hangs a stuffed moose by each table that verbally
comments when a shot is sunk. Customers are amused by the feature because it
makes the pool hall more fun and interesting. The talking moose is not generic, and
122

Id. at 1258-60.

123TMEP, supra note 116, § 1401.
124Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d at 1261.

125See Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality:
Encountering Traffix on the way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 157-58 (2004) ("[E]ven purely
aesthetic product features may be disqualified as 'functional,' if competitors are unable to compete
effectively without access to them.").
126See, e.g., House of Hunan, Inc. v. Hunan at Pavillion, No. 85-1591, 1985 WL 72671, at *1-2
(D.D.C. 1985) (finding a likelihood of success on the merits at the preliminary injunction stage for
trade dress infringement where a Chinese restaurant placed two hand-carved marble lions at the
entrance of the restaurant, even though other similar statues had been used previously by Chinese
restaurants); see generally 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 7:65 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the availability of trade dress protection for both the
interior and exterior of commercial buildings).
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might even be an inherently distinctive aspect of a pool hall service. 1 27 The moose
also is not utilitarian functional because it does not affect the mechanics of playing
pool. 128 However, there could be serious questions with aesthetic functionality. For
instance, one might consider the moose to be an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the business. Nevertheless, the feature does not appear to be
as central to the buying decision as the design of a sofa. Thus, the determination of
aesthetic functionality may require an appraisal of competitive need; that is, the
number of suitable alternatives that are equally appealing to customers. 129
Resolving the issue of competitive need may depend on the abstraction used to
define the service. 1 30 If one perceives the service as a pool hall with a stuffed moose
on the wall, then having the moose talk may be one of the best things to do with the
animal in terms of attracting customers. 1 31 On the other hand, the service may be
viewed as a pool hall with a desirable novelty item. In this event, a talking moose
may be simply one of numerous other clever schemes that could appeal to players.
For instance, a competitor might install a waterfall that changes color to complement
the beat and mood of music. Thus, with this level of abstraction, the talking moose
might serve as a trademark. So which abstraction is correct? Unfortunately, the
decision, as in copyright, must be somewhat ad hoc. 132 In this regard, perhaps one
guidepost is that the decision should be based on competitive realities. 1 33 For
instance, if it is not typical for pool halls to rely on gimmicks to attract customers,
then it may be inappropriate to define the competitive market so broadly. 134
As a final scenario, consider whether trademarks might be used to control the
type of food sold at the pool hall. Certain foods, such as burgers or pizza are too
common to serve as identifiers, but what about a pool hall that serves Chinese food?
What if over time, people begin to associate Chinese food with a particular chain of
pool halls? Although food is utilitarian, the flavor of food is aesthetic, which means
that the inquiry comes down to an evaluation of aesthetic functionality. 1 35 If the
127See, e.g., Planet Hollywood, Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 836 (N.D.
Ill. 1999) ("The Court finds that this presentation of video clips [which replay past grand openings of
other Planet Hollywood restaurants] is part of the distinctive look and feel of Planet Hollywood
restaurants.").
128E.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc.
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
129Vornado Circulation Air Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995).
130See Harold R. Weinberg, Trademark Law, Function Design Features, and the Trouble with
Traffix, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 48 (2001) (discussing how the definition of a market in terms of
aesthetic functionality may both hinder and encourage competition).
131 If a talking moose is regarded as functional, then other attributes of the talking moose, such
as its tone, inflection or vocabulary may still serve trademark functions.
132See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (noting
that in copyright, there is a necessarily vague test for copyright infringement, as there cannot be a
bright line principle).
133HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 7-8.
134Even if the relevant market is defined in terms of novelty items, the talking moose may still
be aesthetically functional. For instance, it may be more desirable because it fits more naturally
into a typical pool hall environment than potential alternatives. It also may be cheaper to provide
than other potential gimmicks having equivalent appeal.
135See Ann Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Getting Real With NontraditionalTrademarks:
What's Next After Red Oven Knobs, The Sound of Burning Methamphetamine, and Goats on a Grass
Roof?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 186, 209 (2011); Amanda E. Compton, Acquiring a Flavor for
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service is defined as pool halls that serve food, then there are numerous possible
choices of cuisine, such as Indian, Thai, and Mexican, along with burgers and pizza.
Nevertheless, a significant subpopulation of consumers might prefer Chinese food to
all other options. Thus, it would be unfair to competitors in terms of attracting these
consumers if one pool hall had the exclusive right to serve their favored food. In
addition, unlike a talking moose, the type of food may be an important criterion that
customers use to select a pool hall. For both of these reasons, Chinese food is
aesthetically functional, and so it needs to be filtered out from the protectable aspects
of trade dress. This also means that the other components of the trade dress need to
be evaluated-regarding genericism and functionality-in terms of pool halls that
serve Chinese food.

V. APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK PRINCIPLES TO GOATS ON A ROOF

The issue at hand is whether a Swedish restaurant can claim exclusive rights
through a trademark to place live goats on a grass roof. The first step in the analysis
is to consider the abstraction that best defines the service that the restaurant
provides to customers. 1 36 Although the service could be as general as a business
satisfying customer needs or a restaurant business, there is little question that the
broadest conception should be a restaurant that serves Swedish food. However, this
abstraction is still too general and must also include Swedish decor because it is now
common for such restaurants to provide the proper atmosphere with the food. Also,
there is certainly a subgroup of Swedes, if not Americans, who would prefer to eat
authentic food in surroundings that mirror the experience in their native land. 137
Al Johnson's is a rural restaurant, and it is typical for these establishments to
have farm animals outside the premises. 1 38 This may be particularly true for
Swedish restaurants that provide a complete experience. Thus, the service concept
must be further particularized to Swedish restaurants with authentic decor and farm
animals on site. Considering the farm animals, it is likely that goats are generic to
Swedish establishments. Even if they are not, however, they certainly would be
aesthetically functional since there are only a few different farm animal species
perhaps only cows and sheep, along with goats-that would be appropriate. This
means that the abstraction must now be redefined to Swedish restaurants with
authentic decor and goats on site. Beyond this, sod roofs are common and generic in
Swedish countries, so the subgroup of Swedish diners would find this attribute

Trademarks: There's No Common Taste in the World, 8 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 340, 341
(2010).

136 See Weinberg, supra note 130, at 28-30 (discussing consumer expectations and purchasing
decisions as related to aesthetic functionality in trade dress).
137See Enrique Bernat F. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The first

explanation for denying trademark protection to generic foreign words is that Spanish-speakers in
the U.S. will understand 'chupa' to be generic.").
138 See, e.g., Barnyard, JOEHUBERS.COM, http://www.joehubers.com/index.php?option com
content&view article&id=62&Itemid=85 (last visited June 9, 2011); Wildlife Zoo, FARMERS INN,
http://www.thefarmersinn.com/wildlife-zoo.htm (last visited June 9, 2011).
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indistinctive. 1 39 Thus, we will begin the next phase of the analysis by defining Al
Johnson's service class as Swedish restaurants with sod roofs having authentic decor
and goats on site.
Relying on the basic abstraction, a rural Swedish restaurant cannot prevent
other establishments from allowing goats to graze on their properties. It is possible,
albeit unlikely, that a restaurant could stake claim to a specific location that goats
are penned, if the business consistently placed the goats only in that particular spot
and consumers, over time, started to associate that location with the restaurant. The
location would not be aesthetically functional, assuming that competitors have
numerous other equally suitable locations that they can select for their goats. Note
also that the restaurant could claim trademark rights to other parameters of goats,
as long as the selected attributes are not competitively superior. 140 Thus, one might
claim a unique breed of goat; or specific number of goats; or one could paint the goats
with a particular color. Also, the goats could be claimed along with other features,
such as the shape or type of pen fencing.
Returning to goat locations, the question is whether Al Johnson's can claim the
roof for trademark rights. Based on an abstraction that includes goats anywhere on
site, the roof is clearly superior to other alternatives in terms of attracting customers.
Obviously, there is no place on the ground that commands the same kind of attention
as having the goats graze on the roof. Thus, the goats are aesthetically functional
under this abstraction based on the competitive need test. 141 Specifying that grass is
included with the goats on the roof does not cure the problem because the sod is
generic to Swedish restaurants. So, unless the conception of the abstraction is
changed, trademark protection must be barred.
One might argue that while goats on the ground are generic, goats on the roof
are something different. One thus might compare the circumstances here with those
related to the talking moose. The restaurant might logically claim that the service
class is not Swedish restaurants with goats on the premises, but rather should be
Swedish restaurants with animals on the roof, or Swedish restaurants with novel
attracttons.
Using the first abstraction, goats on a grass roof would still be aesthetically
functional based on competitive needs. This is because goats may be one of the few, if
not the only, animal that can walk reliably on a slanted roof without falling. 142 COWS
and pigs, for instance, would likely be too messy, heavy and insufficiently surefooted. Sheep might work, but still they would be one of only a couple available
options. Thus, if the competitive class includes animals on a roof, then goats, by
themselves, cannot serve as trademarks. 143 As before, the addition of grass does not
139 Gosta von Schoultz, Construction Techniques and Interior Layouts of Swedish Folk Houses,
12 FOLKLORE FORUM 239, 254 (1979).
140See M-5 Steel Mfg., Inc. v. O'Hagin's, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086, 1096 (T.T.A.B. 2001)
("If a feature asserted as a trademark is the best, or at least one of a few superior designs for its
purpose, competition is hindered.").
141Vornado Circulation Air Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995).
142Wendell H. Harmon, Notes on Mountain Goats in the Black Hills, 25 J. MAMMALOGY 149,
150 (1944).
143See, e.g., Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Int'l, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 218, 227 (D.R.I. 2005) (refusing to
grant protection to plaintiffs heart-shaped measuring spoons because to do so "would interfere with
legitimate (non-trademark related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an
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change the result, not only because sod is generic, but also because the grass surface
serves important functions for the animals in terms of traction, food and their
general welfare.
Alternatively, the goats on the roof might be viewed as just one of many
different kinds of unusual gimmicks that Swedish restaurants might use to attract
patrons. Thus, along with the possibility of putting sheep on the roof, maybe
Swedish restaurants could do other unusual things, such as penning zebras in the
yard or shooting people out of cannons. Perhaps the main difficulty with accepting
this proposition is that it just feels wrong. Maybe it is because the goats on the roof
are probably still a better attraction for a Swedish restaurant than most of the other
conceivable concepts. 1 44 It might also be because Al Johnson's is pushing the
envelope of what trademarks are supposed to protect.
For one, trademarks should not govern key aesthetic features that are important
ingredients in commercial success. 1 45 Although the goats are not the primary reason
that customers go to the restaurant, they certainly are an important consideration
when families with kids choose where they want to eat. In this regard, protecting the
goats would be like giving a pool hall the exclusive right to serve Chinese food, which
clearly is overreaching. Indeed, the advertising slogan, "Come for the goats, stay for
the food," highlights that the goats are a key component of the overall restaurant
experience. 1 46 Also, the goats have a utilitarian function for Swedish restaurants
with authentic sod roofs because they help keep the grass trimmed. 147 According to
Traffix, it might not matter that other methods exist, such as using a lawn mower.148
Rather, the fact that the goats make an important contribution to the restaurant's
lawn maintenance needs is enough. 1 49 Interestingly, the company lawyer illustrated
the overall problem when he reportedly stated to Al Johnson's father, "Lars, you have
something very valuable here." 150 This makes it exceedingly clear that the lawyer
recognized the non-reputation-related advantage that the restaurant would enjoy
through its trademark.
For these reasons, Al Johnson's should not have been granted the sole right to
put goats on the roof of a food service business. This does not mean that the notion of
goats on a roof are totally off limits; rather, they only can be claimed in conjunction

important product ingredient") (citing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §17 cmt. c,
illus. 8 (1995) (noting that a heart-shaped box would be one of a handful of desirable designs for
Valentine's Day candy, such that the shape is considered aesthetically functional and not protected).
144Kristina Jennbert, Sheep and Goats in Norse Paganism, in PECUS: MAN AND ANIMAL IN
ANTIQUITY 160, 160-61 (Barbro Santillo Frizell ed., 2004). The goats may be more attractive
because they conform better to the overall theme of a Swedish restaurant. They also may be
somewhat cheaper to provide than other equally appealing approaches.
145See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
146 Kinsella, supra note 15. One factor that courts often use to determine whether a utilitarian
feature is functional is advertising that touts the utilitarian advantages of the design. See Talking
Rain Beverage Co. v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 349 F.3d 601, 603 (9th Cir. 2003); In re MortonNorwich Prods., Co., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Likewise, advertising that touts the
aesthetic advantages of an attribute should be indicative of aesthetic functionality.
147 Scheck & Woo, supra note 1.
148 Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
149 Id
150 Scheck & Woo, supra note 1.

[10:715 2011]

Trademark Protection of Live Animals

735

with other features that make the specific combination distinctive and nonfunctional.
For instance, Al Johnson's might legitimately be able to acquire exclusive rights to
goats on a sod roof having a particular shape, or with other ornamental features,
such as lights, colors, or the shapes of protective barriers. The PTO has registered at
least one other live animal mark with these kinds of specific additional elements-for
a duck march performed daily at the Peabody Hotels. 15 1 Nevertheless, the agency
clearly made a mistake by granting trademark rights to Al Johnson's restaurant
solely for having goats on a grass roof.

VI. CONCLUSION
The notion that trademarks can provide exclusive rights to the use of live
animals is an interesting new twist to the evolution of trade dress protection. This
article demonstrates that there is nothing inherently wrong with protecting live
animals as long as the use is distinctive and not functional in either the utilitarian or
aesthetic sense. However, the PTO erred when it registered Al Johnson's goats on a
roof because it did not sufficiently evaluate the functional nature of the mark.
Therefore, the mark should be cancelled. 152

151U.S. Trademark Registration No. 2,710,415. The mark consists of live visual and motion
elements of The Peabody Duck March. The motion elements include the red carpet being rolled out,
the appearance of the ducks and uniformed Duckmaster at the elevator door, and the march of the
ducks down the red carpet, up the steps, and into the fountain where they begin swimming. The
mark also includes the fanfare in the reverse sequence.
152 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006) (noting that a petition to cancel a registered mark may be filed
"at any time if the registered mark . . . is functional").

